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tion, the paper seeks to provide an overview of the 
current state of affairs in the realm of regulating hate 
but also to demonstrate that such regulation, as oc-
curring to date, is dysfunctional, predominantly due 
to the vast divergence of US-European approaches 
to the issues of free expression both on and off line. 
It is argued that due to the very nature of the inter-
net as a borderless and global entity, this normative 
divergence cannot be overcome so long as traditional 
approaches to the issue of regulation continue to be 
taken. The paper’s analysis will emanate from the 
premise that there exists a need to strike an equi-
table balance between the freedom of expression on 
the one hand and the freedom from discrimination 
on the other.
Abstract:  This paper will assess the regula-
tion of the internet in the ambit of hate speech ex-
pressed digitally through the internet. To do so, it will 
provide a definitional framework of hate speech, an 
overview of the internet’s role in the ambit of hate 
speech and consider the challenges in legally regu-
lating online hate speech through a discussion of rel-
evant case-law as well as the Additional Protocol to 
the Cybercrime Convention. The jurisprudential anal-
ysis will allow for a comparison of the stances ad-
opted by the ECtHR and national courts of European 
countries on the one hand, and courts of the United 
States on the other, in the sphere under consider-
ation. By looking at regional and national case-law 
and the initiative of the Council of Europe in the form 
of the Additional Protocol to the Cybercrime Conven-
A. Introduction
1 The internet is one of the most powerful 
contemporary tools used by individuals and groups 
to express ideas and opinions and receive and impart 
information.1 It “magnifies the voice and multiplies 
the information within reach of everyone who has 
1 The number of Internet users for 2015 was 3,185,996,155: 
<http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/> 
[Accessed 28th June 2016].
access to it.”2 Notwithstanding the positive aspects 
of this development in the realm of free speech and 
the exchange of ideas, the internet also provides 
a platform for the promotion and dissemination 
of hate.3 In fact, the internet has seen a sharp 
rise in the number of extreme-right websites and 
2 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion 
and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and 
Expression, David Kaye (22 May 2015) A/HRC/29/32, para 
11.
3 Fernne Brennan, ‘Legislating against Internet Race Hate’ 
(2009) 18 Information and Communications Technology Law 
2, 123.
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activity.4 As well as facilitating the promotion 
of hate, the internet has also strengthened the 
far-right movement more generally by bringing 
hate groups together, converging the lines of 
previous fragmentation, thereby contributing 
to the creation of a “collective identity that is so 
important to movement cohesiveness.”5 This has 
occurred on an international level, “facilitating a 
potential global racist subculture.”6 Although hate 
existed long before the creation of the internet, 
this technological advancement has provided an 
effective and accessible means of communication 
and expression for hate groups and individuals 
whilst simultaneously adding a new dimension to the 
problem of regulating hate,7 particularly due to the 
nature of the internet as a global and, to an extent, 
anonymous medium. It is the anonymity of the 
internet which deeply hampers the implementation 
of traditional legal procedures and enforcement of 
traditional laws,8 as the perpetrator cannot readily be 
determined; whilst the global nature of the internet 
means that, even if a perpetrator can be identified, 
bringing him or her to justice may not be possible 
due to jurisdictional limitations.9 Thus, technological 
advances in the form of the internet have altered 
our conceptualisation of a State which habitually 
had jurisdiction over the activities occurring within 
its boundaries. To put it simply, this medium knows 
no borders.
2 In light of the significant role of the internet vis-à-
vis the promotion and dissemination of hate, this 
paper will look at the issue of regulating the internet 
in the ambit of hate speech as digitally expressed by 
individuals and groups. To do so, it will provide a 
definitional framework of hate speech, an overview 
of the internet’s role in the ambit of hate speech and 
consider the challenges in legally regulating online 
hate speech through a discussion of relevant case-law 
as well as the Additional Protocol to the Cybercrime 
Convention. The paper’s analysis emanates from the 
premise that, if the internet is to be dealt with in a 
manner which reflects an adherence to principles 
such as non-discrimination and equality, ”a new 
template for addressing cross-border contracts”10 
4 James Bank, ‘Regulating Hate Speech Online’ (2010) 24 
Computers & Technology 3, 233.
5 Barbara  Perry & Patrick Olsson ‘ Cyberhate: The 
Globalization of Hate’ 18 Information and Communications 
Technology Law 2, 185.
6 Ibid. 
7 Dragos Cucereanu ‘Aspects of Regulating Freedom of 
Expression on the Internet’ (Intersentia 2008) 7.
8 James Banks, ‘Regulating hate speech online’ (2010) 24 
Computers & Technology 3, 233.
9 Christopher D. Van Blarcum, ‘Internet Hate Speech: The 
European Framework and the Merging American Haven’ 
(2005) 62 Washington and Lee Law Review 2, 783.
10 Michael L. Rustad & Tomas H. Koenig, ‘Harmonizing Internet 
Law: Lessons from Europe’ (2006) 9 Journal of Internet Law 
is urgently required. To this end, a comprehensive 
and unified multijurisdictional approach must be 
adopted. However, this has proved difficult to date 
particularly given the stark contrast in the approach 
vis-à-vis free speech adopted by the United States of 
America (USA), on the one hand, and Europe on the 
other. Essentially, as will be reflected hereinafter, it 
is the conceptual understanding of the scope of the 
freedom of expression which deeply hampers the 
creation of an effective regulatory framework for 
internet hate speech.
B. Definitional Framework: 
Hate Speech
3 Hate speech does not enjoy a universally accepted 
definition,11 with most States and institutions 
adopting their own definitions,12 notwithstanding 
that the term is often incorporated in legal, policy, 
and academic documents.13 Although non-binding, 
one of the few documents which has sought to define 
hate speech is the Recommendation of the Council of 
Europe Committee of Ministers on hate speech.14 It 
states that this term is to be ”understood as covering 
all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote 
or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism 
or other forms of hatred based on intolerance, 
including: intolerance expression by aggressive 
nationalism and ethnocentrism, discrimination and 
hostility against minorities, migrants and people of 
immigrant origin.” Interestingly, this definition 
incorporates the justification of hatred as well as 
its spreading, incitement and promotion, allowing 
for a broad spectrum of intentions to fall within its 
definition. However, it leaves out characteristics 
such as sexual orientation, gender identity and 
disability. Hate speech has also been mentioned, 
but not defined, by the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR). For example, the Court has refers 
to hate speech as: “all forms of expression which 
spread, incite, promote or justify hatred based on 
intolerance including religious intolerance.”15 In 
11, 3.
11 European Court of Human Rights, Fact Sheet on Hate 
Speech, 2013, 1.
12 Council of Europe Committee of Experts for the Development 
of Human Rights 2007, Chapter IV, pg.123, para.4.
13 Tarlach McGonagle, ‘The Council of Europe against Online 
Hate Speech: Conundrums and Challenges’ Expert Paper, 
Institute for Information Law, Faculty of Law, <http://hub.
coe.int/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=62fab806-724e-
435a-b7a5-153ce2b57c18&groupId=10227> [accessed 15th 
August 2015] 3.
14 Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers 
Recommendation on Hate Speech 97 (20).
15 Gűndűz v Turkey, App. No 35071/97 (ECHR, 4 December 
2003) para. 40, Erbakan v Turkey, App. No 59405/00, (6 July 
2006) para.56.
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Vejedland v Sweden, in the framework of homophobic 
speech, the Court held that it is not necessary for 
the speech “to directly recommend individuals to 
commit hateful acts”,16 since attacks on persons can 
be committed by “insulting, holding up to ridicule or 
slandering specific groups of the population”17 and 
that speech used in an irresponsible manner may 
not be worthy of protection.18 Through this case, 
the Court drew the correlation between hate speech 
and the negative effects it can have on its victims, 
demonstrating that it is not merely an abstract 
notion, but one with potential to cause harm. In 
addition, the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) 
of the European Union has offered two separate 
definitions of hate speech with the first being that 
it “refers to the incitement and encouragement 
of hatred, discrimination or hostility towards an 
individual that is motivated by prejudice against that 
person because of a particular characteristic.”19 In its 
2009 Report, the FRA held that the term hate speech, 
as used in the particular section “includes a broader 
spectrum of verbal acts including disrespectful 
public discourse.”20 The problematic part of this 
definition is the broad reference to disrespectful 
public discourse, especially since institutions such 
as the ECtHR extend the freedom of expression to 
ideas that “shock, offend or disturb.”21 The  Council 
Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 
2008 on Combating Certain Forms and Expressions 
of Racism and Xenophobia does not directly define 
hate speech, but instead prohibits different forms of 
expression and acts that fall within the framework 
of “Offences Concerning Racism and Xenophobia.”22 
More specifically, Article 1 therein holds that each 
Member State shall punish the public incitement 
to violence or hatred directed against a group of 
persons or a member of a group defined by reference 
to race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic 
origin, the commission of such an act through public 
dissemination of material as well as the acts of 
publicly condoning, denying or grossly trivialising 
particular crimes such as genocide. This definition 
could be used in the realm of hate speech but is 
limited only to particular groups, leaving out others 
such as sexual minorities. In addition, the threshold 
16 Vejdeland and Others v Sweden, App. No 1813/07 (ECHR 09 
February 2012) para.54.
17 Ibid. para.55.
18 Ibid.
19 Hate Speech and Hate Crimes against LGBT Persons, 
Fundamental Rights Agency, 1.
20 Homophobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual 
Orientation and Gender Identity in the EU Member States: 
Part II - The Social Situation, Fundamental Rights Agency, 
44.
21 The Observer and The Guardian v The United Kingdom, 
App. no 13585/88 (ECHR, 26 November 1991) para. 59.
22 Article 1, Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA 
of 28 November 2008 on Combatting Certain Forms and 
Expressions of Racism and Xenophobia.
of this definition is set to hatred or violence, and 
does not integrate other “softer” elements of 
hate speech, such as discrimination. No particular 
reference to internet hate was made in the above 
document; however, nothing in its wording prevents 
it from being used for cases of internet hate. In 2016, 
the “Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate 
Speech Online” was signed by different IT companies 
and the European Commission. This document 
underlines that the aforementioned Council 
Framework Decision must be enforced by Member 
States in online, as well as offline, environments. In 
the framework of academic commentary, there has 
been a plethora of definitions put forth to describe 
hate speech. According to Mari Matsuda, hate 
speech contains a tripartite definition, namely that 
the message is “of racial inferiority, the message is 
directed against historically oppressed groups and 
the message is persecutory, hateful and degrading.”23 
Wrestling offers a broad interpretation of hate speech 
including “virtually all racist and related declensions 
of noxious, identity-assailing expression could be 
brought within the wide embrace of the term.”24 
Alexander Tsesis has described it as a “societal 
virus”,25 while Rodney Smolla refers to the lack of 
contribution hate speech makes to the development 
of society since it “cannot contribute to a societal 
dialogue and therefore can be ethically curtailed.”26 
Scholars, such as Kent Greenawalt have argued about 
the damaging consequences of such speech, arguing 
that “epithets and slurs that reflect stereotypes 
about race, ethnic group, religion and gender may 
reinforce prejudices and feelings of inferiority in 
seriously harmful ways.”27 In discussing bans on 
racist speech, Post examines several arguments that 
have been put forth as justifications for such bans 
including, the “intrinsic harm of racist speech”28 
insofar as there is an “elemental wrongness”29 to 
such expression, the infliction of harm to particular 
groups and individuals, as well as to the marketplace 
23 Mark Slagle, ‘An Ethical Exploration of Free Expression 
and the Problem of Hate Speech’ 24 Journal of Mass Media 
Ethics, 242.
24 Tarlach McGonagle, ‘Wresting Racial Equality from 
Tolerance of Hate Speech’ (2001) 23 Dublin University Law 
Journal 21, 4.
25 Mark Slagle, ‘An Ethical Exploration of Free Expression 
and the Problem of Hate Speech’ 24 Journal of Mass Media 
Ethics, 242.
26 Mark Slagle, ‘An Ethical Exploration of Free Expression 
and the Problem of Hate Speech’ 24 Journal of Mass Media 
Ethics, 242.
27 Kent Greenawalt, ‘Speech, Crime and the Uses of Language’ 
(1989 New York: OUP), Chapter 2.
28 Robert C. Post, ‘Racist Speech, Democracy and the First 
Amendment’ (1990-1991) 32 William and Mary Law Review 
267, 272.
29 Post R.C, ‘Racist Speech, Democracy and the First 
Amendment’ (1990-1991) 32 William and Mary Law Review 
267, 272 quoting Wright ‘Racist Speech and the First 
Amendment’ 9 Miss. C.L.Rev. 1 (1988).
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of ideas.30
4 From the above definitions and the variations 
therein, although some common elements can be 
discerned, it could be argued that “hate speech seems 
to be whatever people choose it to mean.”31 For the 
purpose of this paper, and taking into consideration 
that there is no one universal definition of hate 
speech, a broad definitional basis is embraced. 
As such, hate speech is hereinafter considered to 
mean speech that is targeted towards individuals 
due to their particular characteristics, such as race, 
ethnic origin, nationality, religion, language, sexual 
orientation, gender identity and/or disability.
C. The Role of the Internet 
vis-à-vis Hate Speech
5 The significant role of the internet in any modern 
society was recognised by the European Court of 
Human Rights in Times Newspaper Ltd v UK:
“in light of its accessibility and its capacity to store and 
communicate vast amounts of information, the Internet plays 
an important role in enhancing the public’s access to news 
and facilitating the dissemination of information generally.”32
6 However, as noted above, the internet can also result 
in harmful expression and this reality began to 
surface predominantly during the 1990s. In 1994, the 
UN Secretary General noted that new technologies 
such as computer programmes, video games and the 
Minitel system in France were used to disseminate 
anti-Semitic ideas.33 In 1995, the UN Special 
Rapporteur on contemporary forms of Racism, 
Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related 
Intolerance recorded the growing use of electronic 
media for purposes of international communications 
between far-right groups.34 In 1996, the UN Secretary 
General officially recognised the use of the internet 
and electronic mail as being increasingly used by 
30 Ibid. 273.
31 Roger Kiska, ‘Hate Speech: A Comparison between the 
European Court of Human Rights and the United States 
Supreme Court Jurisprudence’ (2012) 25 Regent University 
Law Review 107,1 10.
32 Times Newspaper Ltd (Nos 1 & 2) v UK, (10 March 2009) 
Application nos 3002/03 and 23676/03, para.27.
33 Secretary-General, Elimination of Racism and Racial 
Discrimination, UN GA, 48th Sess., UN Doc, A/49/677 (1994).
34 Maurice Glele-Ahanhanzo, Implementation of the 
Programme of Action for the Second Decade to Combat 
Racism and Racial Discrimination – Report of the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, CHR 
Res.1994/64, UN ESCOR, 51st Sess., UN Doc. E/CH.4/1995/78 
(1995).
racist organisations to spread their ideology.35 In 
1997, the aforementioned Rapporteur noted that 
“the Internet has already captured the imagination 
of people with a message, including purveyors of 
hate, racists and anti-Semites.”36 The first racist 
website to enter the online world was Stormfront.
org set up by a former Ku Klux Klan member and 
launched in 1995.37 The dramatic rise of internet 
hate is reflected by the figures gathered by the Simon 
Wiesenthal Centre which, in 1995 recorded only one 
racist website38 whereas by 2011 its Digital Terrorism 
and Hate Report had found 14,000 websites, forums 
and social networks which promoted hate.39 
However, these figures must be considered with a 
degree of caution, since monitoring becomes more 
complicated given that websites surface and re-
surface at a very fast pace.40 Websites are not the 
only sub-tool of the internet with forums, blogs, 
social networking sites, emails, newsletters, chat 
rooms and online games being used and abused 
by extremist groups. Social networking sites have 
become “breeding grounds for racist and far-right 
extremist groups to spread their propaganda”,41 with 
the sheer number of users, the accessibility to such 
platforms and the lack of pre-screening of posts or 
the establishment of, inter alia, Facebook groups, 
rendering the prospect of regulation a daunting 
one. In 2008, following a complaint lodged by 
Martin Shulz, Facebook banned several pages used 
by Italian extremists to promote violence against 
Roma.42 It must be noted that those who spread hate 
speech may use the internet to harass the victims 
of their rhetoric directly, to communicate amongst 
35 Secretary – General, Elimination of Racism and Racial 
Discrimination: Measures to Combat Contemporary Forms 
of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related 
Intolerance, UN GA, 51st Sess. UN Doc. A/51/301 (1996).
36 Maurice Glele-Ahanhanzo, Implementation of the 
Programme of Action for the Second Decade to Combat 
Racism and Racial Discrimination – Report of the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, CHR 
Res.1996/21, UN ESCOR, 53rd Sess., UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/71 
(1997).
37 Simon Wiesenthal Report: Online Terror and Hate – 
The First Decade: <http://www.wiesenthal.com/atf/
cf/%7BDFD2AAC1-2ADE-428A-9263-35234229D8D8%7D/
IREPORT.PDF> pg. 7.
38 Simon Wiesenthal Report: Online Terror and Hate – 
The First Decade: <http://www.wiesenthal.com/atf/
cf/%7BDFD2AAC1-2ADE-428A-9263-35234229D8D8%7D/
IREPORT.PDF> pg. 3.
39 Simon Wiesenthal Report: Digital Terrorism and Hate 
Report 2011.
40 Barbara Perry & Patrick Olsson ‘Cyberhate: The Globalization 
of Hate’ 18 Information and Communications Technology 
Law 2, 188.
41 James Bank, ‘Regulating Hate Speech Online’ (2010) 
International Review of Law, 24 Computers & Technology 3, 
234.
42 Dragos Cucereanu ‘Aspects of Regulating Freedom of Expression 
on the Internet’ (Intersentia 2008), 16.
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themselves and build up a “sense of belonging and 
social identity”43 to a unified movement, but also 
to recruit new members through the dissemination 
of their ideology to unsuspecting users who may 
be confronted with such speech through, amongst 
others, web links or emails.44 Further, hate groups 
attract new members, particularly young people, 
through the use of innovative methods such as 
online hate games including “Ethnic Cleaning” and 
“Shoot the Blacks”.
7 Thus, the internet which has been named the 
“network of networks”45 offers endless possibilities 
for hate groups to communicate with each other, 
recruit new members and harass their victims due to 
its vastness, accessibility and nature as a boundary-
free entity governed by no single institution or State. 
It is the very nature of the internet, and the fact 
that its effective regulation is contingent upon a 
common universal approach, which has contributed 
to its regulation posing a particularly challenging 
problem for law-makers.
D. Regulation of Online 
Hate: An Overview
8 Commencing in the 1990s, several calls were made 
for more to be done regarding regulating online 
hate speech. In 1996, the European Commission 
against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) requested 
Council of Europe States to ensure that expression 
disseminated through the internet which incites 
discrimination, hate or violence against racial, 
ethnic, national or religious groups be classed by 
national law as criminal offences and that such 
offences should also incorporate the production, 
dissemination and storage for distribution of harmful 
material.46 In 2000, ECRI issued a general policy 
recommendation on combating the dissemination 
of racist, xenophobic and anti-Semitic material 
via the internet, recommending that States ensure 
that relevant national laws also apply to material 
uploaded on the internet and to prosecute the 
perpetrators of relevant offences.47 ECRI also 
43 Barbara Perry & Patrick Olsson ‘Cyberhate: The Globalization 
of Hate’ 18 Information and Communications Technology 
Law 2, 192.
44 Priscilla Marie Meddaugh & Jack Kay ‘Hate Speech or 
Reasonable Racism? The Other Stormfront’ (2009) 24 
Journal of Mass Media Ethics: Exploring Questions of Media 
Morality 4, 252.
45 Dragos Cucereanu ‘Aspects of Regulating Freedom of Expression 
on the Internet’ (Intersentia 2008) 22.
46 ECRI General Policy Recommendation Number 1 on 
Combatting Racism, Xenophobia, Anti-Semitism and 
Intolerance (4 October 1996), CRI(96) 43 rev.
47 ECRI General Policy Recommendation N°6:  Combating 
the Dissemination of Racist, Xenophobic and Antisemitic 
recommended the clarification of the responsibility 
of the content host, content provider and site 
publishers in the framework of the dissemination 
of racist, xenophobic, and anti-Semitic content 
over the internet.48 In 2001, the Declaration and 
Programme of Action of the Third World Conference 
against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia 
and Related Intolerance noted that States must 
“implement legal sanctions, in accordance with 
relevant international human rights law, in respect of 
incitement to racial hatred through new information 
and communication technologies, including the 
internet.”49 In 2003, partly as a response to the fact 
that the ECRI recommendations on internet hate 
regulation were not adhered to by the Member 
States, the Council of Europe took the first and only 
concrete step in seeking to provide a harmonised 
approach to the regulation of online hate speech, 
through its Additional Protocol to the Cybercrime 
Convention. It must be noted that, although there 
is a general consensus amongst organisations such 
as the Council of Europe, the United Nations, the 
European Union and the Organisation for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe, that internet hate 
should be regulated,50 the UN Special Rapporteur on 
Freedom of Expression held that excessive regulation 
of the internet in order to “preserve the moral fabric 
and cultural identity of societies is paternalistic.”51 
However, no extrapolation was made on what could 
fall within the framework of excessive regulation 
and, thus, no further conclusions can be drawn 
thereof.
9 It is common practice for States to take the 
position that “what is illegal and punishable in an 
offline format must also be treated as illegal and 
punishable online.”52 However, as the internet 
is owned by nobody and everybody and knows 
no physical, electronic, cyber, abstract or other 
boundaries, it allows its users to transmit messages 
beyond any such boundaries; thereby, rendering 
control, censorship and regulation a difficult task. 
 
 
 
Material via the Internet (15 December 2000) CRI(2001)1.
48 Ibid. pg.5.
49 Declaration and Programme of Action: <http://www.
un.org/WCAR/durban.pdf> [Accessed 25 October 2015].
50 Dragos Cucereanu ‘Aspects of Regulating Freedom of Expression 
on the Internet’ (Intersentia 2008) 67.
51 Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Abid Hussain, 
submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights 
resolution 1997/26 (28 January 1998) E/CN.4/1998/40, para. 
45.
52 Yaman Akdeniz ‘Racism on the Internet’ (Council of Europe 
publishing 2009) 21.
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E. The Jurisdictional Problem 
of Regulating Online Hate
10 It is generally accepted that the complexities 
created by jurisdictional issues constitute the 
biggest challenge in the sphere of regulating online 
hate.53 This is because the internet is not marked 
by boundaries, cannot be controlled or censored 
comprehensively by individual States in particular 
situations and, as a consequence, questions are 
raised as to “which law should apply and how to 
delimit competing jurisdictions.”54 This results in 
States finding it “difficult to govern and control the 
flow of information inside and outside their nation 
states.”55 More specifically, regulation problems 
arise where, for purposes of the present discussion, 
the hateful material is created within a State which 
does not prohibit the dissemination of xenophobic 
or racist material on the internet but, due to the 
boundary-free nature of the internet it is accessible 
to or, in fact, uploaded by persons residing in a 
Contracting State.  In fact, on a technical level, it 
is a relatively simple task for individuals who wish 
to publish information that may be prohibited in 
some countries, including their own, to go “forum 
shopping” by choosing internet service providers 
which are located in countries which permit such 
content so as to be sure that, notwithstanding 
potential restrictions in some jurisdictions, the 
material will be available online.56 Forum shopping 
results in the establishment of hate havens, which 
individuals and groups conveniently choose as hosts 
for their material. This is the situation in the USA, 
which is a haven for hate websites.57 The majority of 
hate websites are based in the USA and these include 
those which seek to avoid anti-hate legislation in 
their own country.58 Countries such as Spain, have 
sought to overcome the consequences of such 
havens by allowing the judiciary to block internet 
sites that do not adhere to Spanish law.59 However, 
this method presupposes the continuous monitoring 
of internet sites that are in violation of national law, 
a huge and complex task which cannot possibly be 
efficiently carried out. Either way, the availability 
53 Fernne Brennan, ‘Legislating against Internet Race Hate’ 
(2009) 18 Information and Communications Technology 
Law 2, 276.
54 Dragos Cucereanu ‘Aspects of Regulating Freedom of Expression 
on the Internet’ (Intersentia 2008) 254.
55 Ibid. 22.
56 Ibid.354.
57 Christopher D. Van Blarcum, ‘Internet Hate Speech: The 
European Framework and the Merging American Haven’ 
(2005) 62 Washington and Lee Law Review 2, 822.
58 Agence – France Press, ‘Neo-Nazi websites reported to flee 
Germany’ N.Y. Times (August 21 2000).
59 Christopher D. Van Blarcum, ‘Internet Hate Speech: The 
European Framework and the Merging American Haven’ 
(2005) 62 Washington and Lee Law Review 2, 784.
of havens essentially results in the erosion of the 
weight and role of national laws that seek to restrict 
online hate as they can be circumvented by carrying 
out internet activity in, for example, countries which 
place more emphasis on the freedom of expression 
rather than on the negative effects of hate. This 
results in a “de facto extraterritorial application of 
the laws of some countries known for their robust 
protection of freedom of expression”,60 which in turn 
contributes to the weakening of the more general 
principle of State sovereignty vis-à-vis the regulation 
of internet hate.
11 In Perrin v UK, the ECtHR was confronted with the 
question of jurisdiction in the sphere of the internet. 
It interpreted jurisdiction in a broad sense, arguing 
that the fact that the applicant’s material was 
uploaded by the applicant on a website operated 
and legal in the USA did not free the applicant of 
his responsibilities under UK law which prohibited 
such material.61As such, the Court considered itself 
to have competence ratione loci regarding material 
uploaded62 on the internet, notwithstanding the 
location in which the material was uploaded. 
Furthermore, certain countries have also sought 
to overcome the issue of jurisdiction on a national 
level. For example, in Germany the Federal Court 
held that all material uploaded on the world wide 
web is answerable to German anti-hate legislation 
regardless of the country in which this material 
was created, with the only element posing any sort 
of significance being its accessibility to German 
internet users.63
12 The variation in approaches of different States to 
the issue of hateful expression lies at the heart of 
jurisdictional limitations in the ambit of regulating 
internet hate. A State’s approach to the issue of 
restricting forms of expression will be affected by 
its own “political, moral, cultural, historical and 
constitutional values”64 and it is, in fact, this sharp 
divergence of legal culture in the realm of speech 
between the USA and Europe which has hindered the 
efficacy of any regulatory measures and which has 
rendered the issue of jurisdiction a serious obstacle 
thereto. As will be reflected in the discussion on the 
Additional Protocol to the Cybercrime Convention, 
the variation of approaches between the USA and 
60 Dragos Cucereanu ‘Aspects of Regulating Freedom of Expression 
on the Internet’ (Intersentia 2008) 254.
61 Perrin v UK, App. No 5446/03 (18 October 2005).
62 Nina Vajic & Panayiotis Voyatzis, ‘The Internet and Freedom 
of Expression: a brave new world and the ECtHR’s evolving 
case-law.’ In ‘Freedom of Expression: Essays in Honour of Nicolas 
Bratza’ (eds. 2012 Wolf Legal Publishers) 401.
63 Fernne Brennan, ‘Legislating against Internet Race Hate’ 
(2009) 18 Information and Communications Technology 
Law 2, 263.
64 Dragos Cucereanu ‘Aspects of Regulating Freedom of Expression 
on the Internet’ (Intersentia 2008) 16.
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Europe has limited any formulation of a functioning 
regulatory framework of online hate simply because 
the former adheres to an almost absolutist protection 
of free speech as per the First Amendment, with the 
latter seeking restrictions for purposes of ensuring 
that other fundamental rights and freedoms are 
exercised, such as that of non-discrimination. 
More specifically, in the USA, hate speech can be 
proscribed if it constitutes a “true threat”, a test 
which was developed in the case of Brandenburg v 
Ohio, and underlines that free speech can only be 
limited insofar as advocacy of the use of force “is 
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless 
action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”65 
However, the possibility of this test’s application 
in the sphere of the internet is doubtful, since the 
internet’s “impersonal contact cannot be seen as 
readily meeting the true threat requirement of being 
likely to incite imminent lawless action.”66 As well 
as the true threat test, “fighting words” can also be 
prohibited under US law, a restriction developed in 
the case of Chaplinsky v New Hampshire. There, the 
Court held that expression can be restricted if it is 
made up of fighting words which were deemed to 
be those which “inflict injury or tend to incite an 
immediate breach of the peace”.67 This doctrine was 
considered within the framework of racist expression 
in R.A.V. v City of Saint Paul, in which the Supreme 
Court held that an ordinance which criminalised 
the placing of symbols, such as a burning cross or a 
Nazi swastika on a public or private property, was 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.68 The 
Court held the ordinance unconstitutional because 
it “imposes special prohibitions on those speakers 
who express views on the disfavored subjects of 
race, color, creed, religion or gender”69 and that 
St Paul’s objective to “communicate to minority 
groups that it does not condone the group hatred 
of bias-motivated speech does not justify selectively 
silencing speech on the basis of its content.”70 Thus, 
given that the Supreme Court was willing to find that 
the burning of a cross on a black family’s lawn did 
not fall within the ambit of fighting words and was 
thus acceptable speech, it seems improbable that the 
threshold incorporated from the fighting words test 
could be derived from racist or other hateful speech 
that takes place online.
13 Comparatively speaking, freedom of expression 
in Europe is more readily limited for purposes of 
preventing not only violence, but also discrimination 
65 Brandenburg v Ohio, 395 U.S. 447,445-49 (1969).
66 Christopher D. Van Blarcum, ‘Internet Hate Speech: The 
European Framework and the Merging American Haven’ 
(2005) 62 Washington and Lee Law Review 2 810.
67 Chaplinsky v New Hampshired, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
68 R. A. V. v. St. Paul 505 U.S. 377, 378 (1992).
69 R. A. V. v. St. Paul 505 U.S. 377, 391-393 (1992).
70 R. A. V. v. St. Paul 505 U.S. 377, 393 (1992).
and hate targeted towards an individual or a group 
which has a particular characteristic. This is reflected 
firstly by the fact that the freedom of expression, as 
protected by Article 10 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights, is marked by a series of limitation 
grounds. Subsequently, the ECtHR developed a 
multi-fold test to be applied in considering whether 
the freedom of expression should be permitted 
including: ascertaining whether the limitation 
has a legitimate aim; is proportional to the aim 
pursued; is necessary in a democratic society; and is 
effectuated for purposes of, inter alia, protecting the 
rights and freedoms of others. To date, the Court’s 
jurisprudence shows no tolerance for hate speech 
as reflected in a variety of cases,71 one of which 
will be discussed further below. When seeking to 
restrict hateful expression, the Court usually opts 
to use the limitation grounds found in Article 10, 
but has in some situations72 applied the prohibition 
of the abuse of rights clause of the ECHR. As noted 
by the ECtHR, States must “fight against abuses, 
committed in the exercise of freedom of speech, 
that openly target democratic values.”73 Thus, even 
though this freedom is undoubtedly significant, it 
must nevertheless coexist harmoniously with other 
rights and freedoms, with democracy having the 
duty militantly to protect itself from the abuse of 
expressive freedom.
14 Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to carry 
out an extensive comparative analysis of the stances 
adopted by the USA and Europe, as an entity in the 
form of the Council of Europe as well as individual 
countries which have harmonised their legislation 
with the European Convention on Human Rights, it 
is evident that the approaches of the two are oceans 
away from each other. With such oceans constituting 
dividing lines, and taking into account the necessity 
of coherence vis-à -vis online regulation given the 
nature of the internet, the question of jurisdiction 
remains a key issue.
F. Case-Law on Regulating 
Internet Hate
I. European Court of Human Rights
15 In a recent case on online defamation, the Court 
acknowledged that although “important benefits 
71 See, inter alia, Norwood v UK (Application no. 23131/03) 
(16 November 2004) and Féret v Belgium (application no. 
15615/07) (16 July 2009).
72 Norwood v UK (Application no. 23131/03) (16 November 
2004).
73 Jean-François Flauss, ‘The European Court of Human Rights 
and the Freedom of Expression’ (2009) 84 Indiana Law 
Journal, 809, 837.
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can be derived from the internet in the exercise 
of freedom of expression, it is also mindful that 
liability for defamatory or other types of unlawful 
speech must, in principle, be retained.”74 Although 
this statement was made within the framework of 
defamatory speech, reference was made to other 
unlawful speech, thereby, incorporating hate speech 
as well. Moreover, it is clear that the Court is mindful 
that this medium can establish a framework through 
which unacceptable speech can emanate. Cases have 
come about during which the Court made some 
significant distinctions on the general nature of the 
internet and the consequences arising thereof. For 
example, in K.U. v Finland, which dealt with a minor 
who was the subject of an advertisement of a sexual 
nature on an internet dating site, the Court held 
that the anonymous character of the internet which 
could be used by individuals for the committal of 
criminal offences meant that the State has a positive 
obligation to provide a legal framework through 
which anonymous perpetrators could be identified 
and prosecuted.75 It was also noted that the sheer 
vastness of the internet means that regulation is a 
tricky task and could potentially affect the rights 
and freedoms found in the ECHR. More specifically, 
in Perrin v UK, which dealt with obscene material, the 
Court noted that:
“the electronic network, serving billions of users 
worldwide is not and potentially will never be subject 
to the same regulations and control. The risk of harm 
posed by content and communications on the internet 
to the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and 
freedoms....is certainly higher than that posed by the 
press. Therefore, the policies governing reproduction 
of material from the printed media and the internet 
may differ. The latter undeniably have to be adjusted 
according to technology’s specific features in order to 
secure the protection and promotion of the rights and 
freedoms concerned.”76
16 In relation to how the Court has considered 
the question of the internet and the freedom of 
expression, it could be argued that although the 
ECtHR has looked at several free speech cases 
which are interrelated to the internet, it has not 
yet established a coherent and all-encompassing 
approach to the issue. The Court has been faced 
with just one case relevant to the theme of internet 
hate, during which it decided to replicate its 
positions and stances developed in general Article 
10 cases in internet cases. Specifically, in Féret v 
Belgium, the Court dealt with racist and xenophobic 
74 Delfi AS vs Estonia, (Application no. 64569/09) (16 June 
2015) para.110.
75 K.U. v Finland, (Application no. 2872/02) (2 March 2009) 
para 48-49.
76 Perrin v UK (Application no. 5446/03) (10 October 2005) 
para.63.
statements of the leader of the far-right party Front 
National-National Front, which were transmitted by 
him during his party’s election campaign through 
leaflets and posters as well as being posted on his 
internet site. The Court applied already established 
principles, such as the fact that political speech that 
stirred hatred based on religious, ethnic or cultural 
prejudices was a threat to social peace and political 
stability in democratic States.77 Thus, the fact that 
the internet was used as one of the communication 
mediums did not affect the Court’s stance on hate 
speech and nor did it make particular distinctions 
as to the effect of the internet on the dissemination 
of these ideas.78 However, it is too soon to draw 
concrete conclusions on the Court’s stance on online 
hate and whether it will, in fact, continue simply 
transposing its Article 10 reasoning without any 
further qualifications as to the relevance of the 
nature of the medium used. As noted, “as the wide 
picture of internet related issues is still unfolding, 
it is too early to evaluate the Court’s position in this 
regard.”79
II. National Case-Law
17 There have been some cases which have dealt with 
the regulation of online hate, particularly in the 
form of anti-Semitic material. These cases have 
demonstrated the difficulty in ensuring regulation 
of such material given the antithesis of approaches 
adopted by European countries, on the one hand, and 
the USA on the other. This has resulted in problems 
within the realm of the jurisdictional and technical 
implementation of regulatory orders. 
18 In 1999, Frederick Toben was arrested during a 
visit to Germany for violating German law because 
of the anti-Semitic material he uploaded onto his 
website. A lower court found that Germany could 
not regulate the website as it was based in Australia, 
but this was later reversed by Germany’s High Court 
which held that “German authorities may take legal 
action against foreigners who upload content that 
is illegal in Germany – even though the Websites 
may be located elsewhere.”80 This case reflected 
77 Féret v Belgium, App. no. 15615/07, (ECHR, 16 July 2009) 
para.73.
78 Nina Vajic & Panayiotis Voyatzis, ‘The Internet and Freedom 
of Expression: A Brave New World and the ECtHR’s Evolving 
Case-Law.’ In ‘Freedom of Expression: Essays in Honour of Nicolas 
Bratza’ (eds 2012 Wolf Legal Publishers) 396.
79 Nina Vajic & Panayiotis Voyatzis, ‘The Internet and Freedom 
of Expression: A Brave New World and the ECtHR’s Evolving 
Case-Law.’ In ‘Freedom of Expression: Essays in Honour of Nicolas 
Bratza’ (eds 2012 Wolf Legal Publishers) 405.
80 Christopher D. Van Blarcum, ‘Internet Hate Speech: The 
European Framework and the Merging American Haven’ 
(2005) 62 Washington and Lee Law Review 2 804.
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that German courts adopted a broad interpretation 
of the notion of jurisdiction in the realm of the 
internet. However, had Toben chosen not to travel 
to Germany, he would not have been arrested and 
even following arrest, his website continued to run 
as it was located in a foreign server.
19 In the case of Yahoo! Inc. v La Ligue Contre Le Racism 
et L’Antisemitisme et al,81 two French student 
organisations82 commenced proceedings against 
Yahoo! for allegedly violating French Law by offering 
Nazi memorabilia for auction on its website. Yahoo! 
held that its activities did not fall within French 
jurisdiction as the content was uploaded in the 
USA where such conduct and material is permitted 
under the First Amendment. However, this was not 
accepted by the French Court, which “applied an 
effects-based jurisdictional analysis and granted 
prescriptive jurisdiction describing the sale of Nazi 
paraphernalia.”83 As such, the French Court held 
that Yahoo! was liable for its effects in France and 
particularly for violating R. 645-1 of the French 
Criminal Code which outlaws the sale, exchange 
or display of Nazi related materials or Third Reich 
memorabilia.  The Court required Yahoo! to ensure 
that: French citizens could not access the auctions of 
Nazi objects; to eliminate their access to web pages 
on Yahoo.com displaying text, extracts or quotations 
from Mein Kampf and the Protocols of the Elders of 
Zion; to post a warning to French citizens on Yahoo.
fr that any search through Yahoo.com may lead to 
sites containing material prohibited under Section 
R645-1 of the French Criminal Code; and that such 
viewing of the prohibited material may result in legal 
action against the internet user and to remove it 
from all browser directories accessible in the French 
Republic. The order subjected Yahoo! to a penalty 
of 100,000 Francs for each day it failed to comply 
with the order.84 The order concluded that Yahoo! 
must “take all necessary measures to dissuade and 
render impossible any access via Yahoo.com to the 
Nazi artifact auction service and to any other site 
or service that may be construed as constituting an 
apology for Nazism or a contesting of Nazi crimes”.85 
Although Yahoo! took certain steps such as including 
the required warning regarding the French Criminal 
Code on its Yahoo.fr website and amending its 
auction policy, it did not conform to all the orders 
81 Yahoo, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 
et al 145 F. Supp. 2d 1168, Case No. C-00-21275JF (N.D. Ca., 
September 24, 2001).
82 The League Against Racism and Anti-Semitism and The 
Union of Jewish Students of France.
83 James Bank, ‘Regulating Hate Speech Online’ (2010) 
International Review of Law, 24 Computers & Technology 3, 
235.
84 Yahoo, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 
et al. 145 F. Supp. 2d 1168, Case No. C-00-21275JF (N.D. Ca., 
September 24, 2001).
85 Ibid.
and instead sought a declaratory judgment from a US 
Court that the French Order could not be enforced 
in the USA. In granting the judgment, the Court 
considered the issue of jurisdiction and approach 
to free expression underlining that: 
“what is at issue here is whether it is consistent with the 
Constitution and laws of the United States for another nation 
to regulate speech by a United States resident within the 
United States on the basis that such speech can be accessed 
by Internet users in that nation.”86
20 It further held that the First Amendment does “not 
permit the government to engage in viewpoint-
based regulation of speech absent a compelling 
governmental interest which compelling interest 
was not present in this case.”87
21 The case of Yahoo! demonstrates the technical and 
legal consequences of jurisdictional issues vis-à -vis 
the regulation of the internet. The material was 
uploaded in a State which permitted the selling 
of such material, but was accessible to citizens of 
another State where the selling of such material 
was a criminal offence. Given the borderless nature 
of the internet, this can happen easily and readily. 
Although the French Court viewed jurisdiction in a 
broad sense, basing its interpretation on the effects 
of the material on its own citizens and its own 
laws, and notwithstanding the issuance of a Court 
Order, this was deemed by the USA to be invalid 
since it could not be constitutionally justified in 
that country. This subsequently demonstrates that, 
given the vast divergence of opinion and approaches 
between Europe and the USA in the realm of free 
speech and given that jurisdiction in the ambit of 
internet regulation is nothing but a lucid notion, 
those States which seek to impose restrictions to 
expression and material available online will meet 
both legal and technical obstacles, whilst their 
previous ideals pertaining to national sovereignty 
and the conservation of their own legal culture 
become increasingly diluted. In fact, as noted by one 
commentator “the judicial impasse of the Yahoo! case 
exemplifies the cultural tension inherent in attempts 
to regulate online speech extraterritorially”88 with of 
course the notion of territory taking on a different 
meaning in the digital era.
22 Further, Ernst Zündel, a German living in Canada 
was “one of the world’s most prominent distributors 
of revisionist neo-Nazi propaganda.”89 In 1997, the 
86 Ibid.
87 Yahoo, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 
et al 145 F. Supp. 2d 1168, Case No. C-00-21275JF (N.D. Ca., 
September 24, 2001).
88 James Bank, ‘Regulating Hate Speech Online’ (2010) 24 
Computers & Technology 3, 235.
89 Dragos Cucereanu ‘Aspects of Regulating Freedom of Expression 
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Canadian Human Rights Tribunal considered a 
complaint brought against Zündel and his website 
Zündeliste,90 which was registered on a US server, 
on the grounds that it promoted hatred or contempt 
of Jews.91 In 2002, the Tribunal decided that hate 
could not be tolerated on the internet or on other 
mediums and ordered Zündel to cease and desist 
from publishing hate messages on his website.92 In 
2005 Zündel was deported to Germany on security 
grounds where he was found guilty of inciting 
racial hatred, libel and disparaging the dead, and 
in 2007 was sentenced to five years in prison.93 
Notwithstanding that the ideas and messages 
disseminated through his website led to the decision 
of the Canadian Tribunal and his subsequent 
imprisonment in Germany, the Zündeliste is still 
running through a US server. This demonstrates that 
the technological nature of the internet, in addition 
to the divergence marking the US and European 
approaches to free speech, has essentially nullified 
one of the purposes of the Canadian and German 
proceedings; namely the removal of what they 
considered to be hate speech from the internet. The 
difference in approach was further manifested on a 
technical level and particularly following a request 
from Germany to the internet service provider 
Deutsche Telekom to prevent users from accessing 
Zündel’s site. Deutsche Telekom accepted and, in 
response to this, users based in the USA created 
mirror sites, thereby, making the content available 
to German users in alternative ways.94 Thus, even 
seeking to ensure regulation of ISPs cannot actually 
ensure the prevention of access to material which a 
State seeks to limit.
23 In the 2002 case of Warman v Kyburz, which dealt 
with anti-Semitic content of Kyburz’ website, the 
Canadian Human Rights Tribunal considered the 
problems posed in the realm of cease and desist 
orders as issued in Zündel’s case, by the nature of the 
internet as a borderless medium and the possibility 
for the creation of mirror sites.95 Either way, the 
Tribunal found that “despite these difficulties and 
technical challenges, a cease and desist order can 
on the Internet’ (Intersentia 2008) 67.
90 Institute for Historical Review: The Importance of the 
Zündel Hearing in Toronto: <http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v19/
v19n5p-2_Weber.html> [Accessed 23 October 205].
91 Institute for Historical Review: The Importance of the 
Zündel Hearing in Toronto: <http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v19/
v19n5p-2_Weber.html> [Accessed 23 October 205].
92 Nathan Hall, Abbee Corb, Paul Giannasi, John G.D. Grieve, 
‘The Routledge International Handbook on Hate Crime’ (eds. 
Routledge 2015).
93 Dragos Cucereanu ‘Aspects of Regulating Freedom of Expression 
on the Internet’ (Intersentia 2008) 68.
94 James Bank, ‘Regulating Hate Speech Online’ (2010) 24 
Computers & Technology 3, 281.
95 Warman v Kyburz, (2003 CHRT 18) (2003/05/09) para. 81.
have both a practical and symbolic effect”96 as it 
prevents the ongoing publishing of hateful material 
and demonstrates public dismay at such hate. In 
relation to the former, it could safely be said that 
this is not the case since, for example, even following 
the Tribunal’s decision regarding the Zündeliste, 
material continued and continues to be uploaded 
thereto through the US server.
24 The above cases reflect the difficulties related 
to regulating online hate given the notion of 
jurisdiction, which is unclear in the realm of the 
internet and its borderless nature. Both the European 
Court of Human Rights and national courts of States 
such as Germany and France, have interpreted this 
notion broadly. However, as seen from Yahoo!, 
American courts are ready and willing to limit any 
sort of effect that restrictive orders may have on 
internet users in the USA, always in the spirit of the 
First Amendment.
G. The Additional Protocol to the 
Convention on Cybercrime
25 The Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime 
is the first multilateral treaty that aims to combat 
crimes committed through computer systems 
and has, to date, been ratified by 47 countries.97 
This Convention was signed and ratified not only 
by Council of Europe States, but also by the USA 
which, although is not a member of this entity, 
has an observer status. Interestingly however, 
the USA acceded to the Convention only after the 
issue of online hate was removed from the table 
of discussions.98 This reality demonstrates that 
“fundamental disagreements remain as to the most 
appropriate and effective strategy for preventing 
dissemination of racist messages on the Internet”,99 
which subsequently contribute to the weakening 
or even nullification of regulatory measures that 
may be adopted by particular States given that 
internet regulation requires co-operation for both 
technical and legal reasons as discussed above. 
To fill the resulting gaps, the Council of Europe 
subsequently developed the Additional Protocol to 
the Cybercrime Convention. This has been ratified by 
24 countries.100 The Council of Europe recognised the 
96 Ibid. Para.82.
97 List of signatures and ratifications available at: <http://www.
coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/
treaty/189/signatures>.
98 James Banks, ‘Regulating Hate Speech Online’ (2010) 24 
Computers & Technology 3, 236.
99 Dragos Cucereanu ‘Aspects of Regulating Freedom of Expression 
on the Internet’ (Intersentia 2008) 17.
100 List of signatures and ratifications available at: <http://www.
coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/
treaty/189/signatures>.
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limitations in implementing a unilateral approach 
to the issue of online hate in the form of racist or 
xenophobic hate and, thereby sought to ensure a 
common set of standards for participating States 
and promote co-operation amongst them in the 
criminalisation of relevant acts.101 This document is 
seen as a “supplement”102 to the Convention so as to 
ensure that the latter’s procedural and substantive 
provisions encompass racism and xenophobia online. 
Thus, a series of the Convention’s articles apply 
mutatis mutandis to the Protocol under consideration 
including, amongst others, Article 13 on sanctions 
and measures and Article 22 on jurisdiction.
26 However, even at first sight, this document comes 
with several significant limitations which will be 
discussed hereinafter. Firstly, as demonstrated in its 
title, this Protocol tackles only racist and xenophobic 
hate, completely disregarding other forms of hate 
on grounds including, but not limited to, sexual 
orientation, gender identity and disability, whilst 
religion is considered a protected characteristic 
within the definitional framework set out by 
Article 2. Thus, there seems to be an unjustified 
prioritisation of online hate with the Council of 
Europe almost arbitrarily seeking to regulate the 
effects of racism and xenophobia online, leaving 
victims of other types of hate without a respective 
legal framework.
27 The Additional Protocol to the Cybercrime 
Convention defines what is meant by racist and 
xenophobic material, underlines the measures 
to be taken at national level in relation to the 
dissemination of such material,103 prohibits racist 
and xenophobic threats and insults professed 
through computer systems104 as well as the denial, 
gross minimisation, approval or justification of 
genocide or crimes against humanity.105 The Protocol 
also renders the intentional aiding and abetting of 
any of the above a criminal offence. It must be noted 
that, unlike Article 9 of the Cybercrime Convention 
which deals with child pornography, the Protocol 
does not criminalise the possession and procurement 
of racist and xenophobic material.106 As noted in the 
Explanatory Note of the Protocol, in order to amount 
to an offence, racist and xenophobic material, insults 
and revisionist rhetoric must occur on a public level, 
101 James Banks, ‘Regulating Hate Speech Online’ (2010) 24 
Computers & Technology 3, 236.
102 Article 1, Additional Protocol t the Convention on 
Cybercrime, concerning the criminalization of acts of a 
racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer 
systems.
103 Additional Protocol, Article 3.
104 Additional Protocol, Article 4 and Article 5.
105 Additional Protocol, Article 5.
106 Dragos Cucereanu ‘Aspects of Regulating Freedom of Expression 
on the Internet’ (Intersentia 2008) 50.
a point which has been incorporated for purposes 
adhering to Article 8 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights.107
28 In relation to the acts that are to be deemed offences, 
it becomes clear that the freedom of expression is 
“the sacred cow against which the legislation seeks 
to justify its apparent encroachment for the sake 
of providing a measure to prohibit cybercrimes 
motivated by race hate.”108 To illustrate this, one can 
turn to Article 3 on the dissemination of racist and 
xenophobic material through computer systems, 
with part 1, therein, providing that:
“each party shall adopt such legislative and other measures 
as may be necessary to establish as criminal offence under 
its domestic law, when committed intentionally and without 
right, the following conduct: distributing or otherwise making 
available, racist and xenophobic material to the public 
through a computer system.”
29 However, Part 3 holds that a party may reserve the 
right not to apply the above paragraph to those 
cases of discrimination for reasons of upholding 
free expression. Thus, the Protocol, as an initiative 
to combat online hate, has been “thwarted through 
the compromise they have made to concerns about 
freedom of expression”109 with much less regard 
evidently being given to freedoms such as that of 
non-discrimination. It could thus be argued that 
the Protocol undermines itself by its approach in 
that the Council of Europe has given an unequal and 
unjustifiable emphasis on expression rather than 
non-discrimination and equality. 110
30 In relation to general limitations that may be 
imposed on the applicability of Article 3, Part 2 
therein, holds that a State may choose not to attach 
criminal liability to conduct referred to in Part 1 if 
this does not promote violence or hatred insofar 
as other effective remedies are available. This is 
notwithstanding the fact that in the Protocol’s title, 
reference is made to the criminalisation of racist 
and xenophobic acts committed through computer 
systems. Whilst criminalising racist and xenophobic 
threats has no option to disregard parts of its 
provisions, Article 5 on racist and xenophobic insults 
provides that a State has the right not to apply in 
whole or in part, Part 1 of this Article, which sets 
out the legislative and other measures that may be 
adopted to criminalise racist and xenophobic insults. 
Although no direct reference to free expression is 
made here as the justifier of such limitation, it could 
107 Explanatory Note to the Additional Protocol, para. 29.
108 Fernne Brennan, ‘Legislating against Internet Race Hate’ 
(2009) 18 Information and Communications Technology 
Law 2, 124.
109 Ibid. 123.
110 Ibid. 126.
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implicitly be assumed that concerns regarding the 
freedom of expression led to the formulation of the 
aforementioned reservation available to those who 
want it. Reserving the right not to apply a particular 
provision is also incorporated into the denial, gross 
minimisation, approval, or justification of genocide 
or crimes against humanity. Many of the States 
which ratified the Protocol took the opportunity to 
incorporate reservations. It generally appears that 
Article 4 on racist and xenophobic threats is the one 
granted the most protection as it extends to private 
as well as public communications, unlike the other 
acts found in the Protocol, while it gives no opt-out 
possibility as the others do.
31 The issue of intent is also significant when seeking 
to appraise the Protocol. This document renders 
the dissemination of material, threats, insults 
and revisionist rhetoric offences illegal as well as 
aiding and abetting the committal of such offences 
in the event that such acts and/or expressions are 
effectuated and/or uttered intentionally. This is 
particularly significant in the realm of the liability 
of internet service providers who simply constitute 
the platform through which problematic speech 
may arise. The Explanatory Report to the Additional 
Protocol to the Cybercrime Convention holds that 
the precise meaning of “intentionally” should 
be interpreted on a national level.111 However, it 
did clearly stipulate that it is not sufficient for an 
internet service provider which simply constitutes 
the host of the material to be found guilty of any 
of the Protocol’s offences if the required intent 
under domestic law did not exist.112 Thus, on the 
one hand it does limit the liability of unknowing 
ISPs but leaves the general conceptualisation of 
intent unsure and contingent on national positions. 
However, the Protocol does not regulate or prohibit 
the finding of permissive intent in the event that an 
ISP is made aware of racist or xenophobic material or 
expression and does not take the necessary measures 
to remove it, thereby, leaving some doors open for 
finding potential liability in the inaction of ISPs. 
Such permissive intent is found, for example, in 
Germany’s Information and Communications Service 
Act of 1997, which underlines the liability of ISPs in 
the event that they knew of hateful content, had 
the ability to block it, but chose not to.113 Further, 
in the realm of ISPs, the Protocol remained silent 
on the very significant question of jurisdiction in 
the event of a conflict of law between the hosting 
country and the other.114 Although for EU countries, 
111 Explanatory Note to the Additional Protocol, para. 25.
112 Ibid. para. 25.
113 Christopher D. Van Blarcum, ‘Internet Hate Speech: The 
European Framework and the Merging American Haven’ 
(2005) 62 Washington and Lee Law Review 2, 796.
114 Ibid. 801.
the Directive on Electronic Commerce115 is applicable 
with Article 3, therein providing that ISPs are 
governed by the laws of the Member State in which 
they are established,116 the situation is not clear in 
the event that a non-EU country is involved in a 
particular dispute.117
32 Although the Protocol may contribute to promoting 
harmonisation regarding agreed upon principles 
and procedural, technical and legal cooperation 
amongst States, the Protocol remains problematic. 
This is the case not only due to its inherent 
limitations as described above, but also due to the 
fact that the USA is not part of it. This, in addition 
to the absence of any form of extradition treaties 
between the USA and other countries in the sphere 
of online hate speech, deeply restricts the efficacy 
of the Protocol’s aims and objectives. Moreover, it 
may well appear that the Protocol has sought to 
achieve the lowest possible common denominator, 
maybe for purposes of maximising ratification. 
Either way, the aforementioned delimitations may 
serve as stumbling blocks when seeking to meet 
the objectives of the Protocol. Furthermore, as 
well as limitations as a result of an over-emphasis 
on the freedom of expression, it could be argued 
that the Protocol constitutes an ineffective base 
through which online hate can be restricted since it 
adopts traditional conceptions of State boundaries, 
State sovereignty on issues such as the freedom of 
expression mentioned above, and, more generally, 
treats the issue of online hate as any other issue 
of traditional means of communication throwing 
in the concept of international co-operation 
without effectively and pragmatically considering 
the challenges of the internet. However, “the 
Internet is a very different animal from that we 
are used to, which requires handling in a different 
way”,118 but this has not been taken on board. 
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H. Conclusion
33 Hate and hateful expression existed before the 
creation of the internet and will continue to exist 
even if tight regulation of online activity were to 
be achieved.119 However, the internet has brought 
about “socio-technological and legal dilemmas that 
are difficult to handle from a legal point of view”.120 
Moreover, the issue of online hate is moving in new 
dimensions, with those who disseminate hate speech 
finding themselves before an array of possibilities 
to use and abuse the internet for purposes of 
communication, recruitment and victimisation. 
However notwithstanding that some case-law has 
been formulated on a national, transnational and 
regional level and, even though the Additional 
Protocol to the Cybercrime Convention has been 
formulated, the issue of online regulation has not 
essentially taken any pragmatically significant steps. 
Firstly, the Protocol itself is lacking as per its scope, 
as it is arbitrarily limited to racist and xenophobic 
speech whilst simultaneously limiting its efficacy 
for purposes of giving particular protection to the 
freedom of expression. Secondly, the normative 
US-European divergence of the understanding 
of free expression has dramatically affected the 
regulation that Europe seeks to achieve. As noted 
by one commentator, the global, boundary-free 
nature of the internet in conjunction with the 
absolutist approach to expression, as so adopted 
by the USA, means that “like chasing cockroaches, 
squashing one does not solve the problem when 
there are many more waiting behind the walls – 
or across the border”.121 More particularly, even if 
a website is shut down in Germany for example, it 
may almost immediately pop up again through an 
American host. At the same time, American courts 
are not ready to apply any court orders issued in 
European countries insofar as they are considered 
to be contrary to the First Amendment. Thus, at the 
heart of these differences lie fundamental conflicts 
of legal thought on speech. Interestingly in the case 
of Yahoo!, the US court recognised that, given that 
no international treaty or standards were available 
in the realm of tackling issues on internet speech, the 
Court is bound by the First Amendment. However 
following the Yahoo! judgement, the USA finally had 
the opportunity to be part of such an agreement, 
however not only opted out of the Additional 
Protocol to the Cybercrime Convention, but also 
made its accession to the convention contingent on 
the exclusion of this theme from the Convention. 
In brief, there is no intent at the moment on the 
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part of the USA to be part of such an international 
collaboration in the field of free speech simply 
because this State’s understanding of free speech 
does not endorse regulation of hatefulness unless 
certain high and immediate thresholds, as discussed 
above, are applied. The result of this approach is 
that, due to the technical nature of the Internet, the 
First Amendment has now taken the position as a 
“default standard for free speech on the Internet”122 
whether other States like it or not. Thus for the 
moment, it is safe to say that realistic prospects 
of internet regulation seem unlikely, especially if 
traditional and purely legal methods are adopted 
for this purpose.
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